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This paper examines the association between economic development and two measures of 
public spending on education, namely the ‘national effort’ (total spending as a percentage of 
GDP) and ‘budget share’ (total spending as a percentage of total government spending). Using 
data for a large sample of countries from 1989 to 2015, we illustrate a novel application of 
Wagner’s law. We compare mean levels of national effort and budget share measures for 
economically and politically distinct groups of countries. We find that the signs of the 
associations between the level of economic development and the two education spending 
measures differ. This implies that richer countries have larger public sectors than do poorer 
countries, consistent with Wagner’s Law. The findings are summarized in the form of three 
inequality propositions about the national effort, budget share and size of government for richer 
versus poorer countries. In addition, for comparable levels of economic development, 
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Wagner’s law (after Adolph Wagner, 1835-1917) postulates that the size of the public 
sector (including public education spending) is positively related to the level of economic 
development (Wagner, 1883, 1958; Musgrave and Peacock, 1958). Wagner (1892) attributes 
growth in public sector activity to progress in the state of the cultural and economic 
environment, so social progress and income growth are associated with bigger government 
(Kuckuck, 2014). Richer, more developed, countries have greater resources with which to fund 
various social programmes, such as education (Brown and Hunter, 2004). When the public 
sector expands, public provision of education is also likely to expand if governments view 
education as a productive component of their spending. Despite uncertainty about the direction 
of causation, Wagner’s law represents a testable empirical regularity. Indeed, income per capita 
has been widely used as an explanatory variable in studies of education spending; see, for 
example, recent studies by Afonso and Alves (2017), Cockx and Francken (2016) and 
Garritzmann and Seng (2016). 
Whether richer countries, on average, are necessarily associated with greater public 
spending on education, regardless of the measure used, is a matter of empirical inquiry. For 
instance, we do not know how the mean levels of two ‘headline’ measures of public spending 
on education, namely the ‘national effort’ (total spending as a percentage of GDP) and ‘budget 
share’ (total spending as a percentage of total government spending), vary across different 
groups of countries, where the groups are defined by economic and political characteristics. Do 
richer countries have larger public education sectors in both national effort and budget share 
terms? Our paper addresses this question, provides a global comparative view of education 
spending patterns, and delivers a novel perspective on Wagner’s Law. 
The key question to be answered is whether there exist differences in the mean levels of 
the national effort or budget share measures for economically and politically distinct groups of 
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countries. Several hypotheses can be formulated from the relevant empirical literature. 
Contemporary evidence suggests a positive relationship between the national effort measure 
and economic development (Cockx and Francken, 2016; Akanbi and Schoeman, 2010; Huber, 
et al., 2008; Busemeyer, 2007; Stasavage, 2005; Baqir, 2002; Ram, 1995; Tilak, 1989). 
Evidence concerning the budget share is more limited. The few existing studies mostly report 
a positive association between budget share and economic development (Fosu, 2010; 
Stasavage, 2005; Baqir, 2002), although the relationship is not always significant and the 
studies by Fosu and Stasavage are for African countries only. However, it is reasonable to 
suppose that, as countries grow and develop, the size and complexity of their respective public 
sectors (the variety of public goods to be financed by government) should grow, so education 
will comprise a reducing share of the total budget allocation, ceteris paribus. This would 
certainly be true if education is a ‘necessity’ with respect to total government spending.  
In addition, regardless of the outcome measure (national effort or budget share), 
democratic countries can be expected to spend more on education, ceteris paribus, because 
socio-political pressures placed on governments compel them to be more accountable to the 
citizenry. Spending more on socially productive public goods, such as education, provides a 
politically popular way for governments to demonstrate accountability and broaden their voter 
pool. Brown and Hunter (2004), for example, make this point with respect to spending on 
primary education in Latin America. Many empirical studies find evidence in favour of higher 
public education spending in democracies; see, for example, Garritzmann and Seng (2016), 
Avelino et al. (2005), Stasavage (2005) and Baqir (2002). Consequently, in our analysis, 
countries are categorized by political regime as well as by levels of income. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and outlines the 
empirical method to be applied. Section 3 reports the empirical results and checks for 
robustness. Section 4 discusses the main findings. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Data and Empirical Method 
We use annual panel data for up to 193 countries from 1989 to 2015, although the number 
of available observations depends on the variables being considered. Table 1 presents details 
of the data collected. Two different continuous outcome measures for public education 
spending are examined, namely the national effort (psegdptot) and budget share (psegovtot). 
Three key categorical explanatory measures are used. The level of economic development 
(ypc2015) is represented by a set of dummy variables, categorizing countries into five groups 
adapted from the World Bank’s Country and Lending Groups as at 2015, based on gross 
national income (GNI) per capita in US dollars. The sample contains representation across the 
full range of income levels. The richest group consists of the ‘core’ 21 Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The other four groups are high 
income (non-OECD), upper middle income, lower middle income, and low income countries. 
Appendix Table A1 gives a list of countries included in each income group.  
An alternative classification of countries by development status is based on a binary richer-
country/poorer-country split, defined in terms of regional country groupings (region). 
Appendix Table A2 provides a list of countries included in each type of group. A binary 
perspective on education spending patterns can be explored by using a pair of regional dummy 
variables representing rich versus poor countries.  
A classification of countries depending on whether they are democratic or non-democratic 
(poldemoc) is used to represent different political regime types. A classification of countries 
by regime type (democratic versus non-democratic) is not listed because this can vary over 
time. For all three of the key categorical explanatory measures, sample selection bias is 
mitigated because the economic groupings of countries are invariant over the study period, and 





Data definitions and sources. 
Variable 
name 
Description of the variable Source 
Dependent Variables 
psegdptot Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) World Bank EdStats 
psegovtot 
Public spending on education, total (% of total government 
spending) 
World Bank EdStats 
Explanatory Variables 
ypc2015 GNI per capita country grouping in 2015, 21 OECD countries World Bank (Atlas Method) 
region Richer (versus poorer) country regions Authors’ compilation 
poldemoc Political democracy classification: yes; no Freedom House 
Control Variables 
pop024 Population aged 0-24 (% of total population) World Bank EdStats 
urban Urban population (% of total population) World Bank WDI 
trade Exports plus imports of goods & services (% of GDP) World Bank WDI 
hci Human capital index Penn World Table 9.0 
pop65 Population aged 65 and above (% of total population) World Bank WDI 
military Military expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank WDI 
fiscbal Fiscal balance (% of GDP) World Bank DPG 
debt General government gross debt (IMF, % of GDP) World Bank TCdata360 
Notes: EdStats refers to the World Bank’s Education Statistics database (World Bank, 2017a). TCdata360 
refers to the World Bank’s TCdata360 database (World Bank, 2017b). WDI refers to the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2017c). DPG refers to the World Bank’s Development 
Prospects Group: A Cross-Country Database of Fiscal Space (World Bank, 2017d). The pop024 variable is the 
sum of pop014 and pop1524 variables from the World Bank EdStats database. Freedom House refers to the 
Freedom in the World survey data (Freedom House, 2016). See Feenstra et al. (2015) for the Penn World Table 
9.0 source. 
 
Several potentially important control variables are included in the analyses. The size of the 
school-going population up to age 24 (pop024) captures the positive demographic effect of the 
proportion of young people on education spending (Busemeyer, 2008, 2007; Brown and 
Hunter, 2004; Castles, 1989). The urbanisation ratio (urban) captures the positive effect of a 
greater concentration of the total population in urban areas on a government’s propensity to act 
in favour of fundamental social needs, such as education (Akanbi and Schoeman, 2010; Huber 
et al., 2008; Avelino et al., 2005; Baqir, 2002; Schultz, 1988). Total international trade (trade) 
is often included in empirical analyses of education spending (Busemeyer, 2009; Huber et al., 
2008; Iversen and Stephens, 2008; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001). This allows for two 
possible effects: a positive compensation effect, in which government ‘compensates’ society 
for the adverse effects of globalisation through greater social and welfare spending, and a 
negative efficiency effect, in which government sees increased globalisation as a mechanism 
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to promote competitiveness, reducing the need for social and welfare spending.1 Which trade 
effect dominates is an empirical question.  
A number of other control variables are used for robustness checking. The size of the 
population aged 65 and above (pop65) represents a demographic cohort that competes for 
education spending in the form of transfer payments to the elderly population (Busemeyer, 
2008; Iversen and Stephens, 2008; Avelino et al., 2005; Brown and Hunter, 1999). Military 
spending (military) is also expected to compete for education’s share of public resources, 
especially in countries with a large military presence (Baqir, 2002). The fiscal balance (fiscbal) 
and gross public debt stock (debt) are both expected to have implications for how much of the 
public purse is allocated to education (Busemeyer, 2009; Huber et al., 2008; Tilak, 1990, 1989). 
Human capital development, as measured by the Penn World Table human capital index (hci), 
is not typically used in this empirical literature, but is included to control for the current-period 
stock of human capital as a proxy for the quality of education in a country. 
Table 2 reports pooled descriptive statistics for each variable. Data availability is a 
pervasive problem in the literature on education spending. The two measures of education 
spending are available for fewer countries (N) and a smaller average number of time-series 
observations than are any of the explanatory variables: the sample is roughly half as large in 
most cases. Descriptive results are not reported for ypc2015, region and poldemoc because 
these are sets of binary variables used to characterize broad political and economic categories.  
The approach we adopt – a (conditional) generalized-form t-test in the context of a factor-
variable interaction model – aims for a descriptive characterization of average differences  
 
 
                                                          
1 More detailed explanations of the compensation and efficiency hypotheses are provided by Walter (2010), 










N Countries Years Mean Std dev. Minimum Maximum 
psegdptot 1989-2015 2551 193 13.2 4.505 2.007 0.781 44.334 
psegovtot 1989-2015 2255 181 12.5 14.849 5.036 2.563 47.279 
ypc2015 1989-2015 5859 217 27.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
region 1989-2015 3024 112 27.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
poldemoc 1989-2015 5105 193 26.5 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
pop024 1990-2015 4714 184 25.6 49.977 13.687 20.160 73.288 
urban 1989-2015 5799 215 27.0 55.788 24.901 5.342 100.000 
trade 1989-2015 4785 193 24.8 86.996 52.290 0.021 531.737 
hci 1989-2014 3703 143 25.9 2.342 0.694 1.028 3.734 
pop65 1989-2015 5234 195 26.8 7.073 4.814 0.697 26.342 
military 1989-2015 3870 166 23.3 2.433 3.210 0 117.388 
fiscbal 1990-2015 4184 191 21.9 -2.299 13.715 -505.442 122.188 
debt 1989-2015 3796 186 20.4 57.015 49.714 0 789.833 
Notes: Years refers to the average number of years (time-series observations) for each country. Std dev. 
refers to the overall standard deviation. Two changes were made to the original data for the psegdptot 
variable. The zero observation for Turkey in 1998 was deleted (because there were no other 0% values in 
the dataset; nil or negligible appeared in the original UNESCO source data for this observation) and the 
observation for Tuvalu in 1997 (3730833.5%) was deleted as an obvious mistake; this extreme value for 
this observation also appeared in the original UNESCO source data. 
 
between broad groupings of countries, rather than implying specific causal linkages. The  
method is a variant of fixed effects estimation, but instead of estimating country fixed effects, 
more highly aggregated group effects are estimated. Testing for differences in the mean levels 
of education spending for the economic and political groupings is equivalent to performing 
multiple t-tests using a joint regression modelling framework. An advantage of this method is 
that mean differences can be estimated while controlling for other relevant variables. The 
regression equations include interactions of political and economic dummy variables, allowing 
for different intercepts in each political-economic group. However, no other interaction terms 
are included, and the parameters for the controls are assumed to be constant across all countries. 
Allowing for heterogeneous group parameters would mean having to interact all of the group 
dummies with the control variables, leading to a proliferation of explanatory variables and 
excessive multicollinearity. 
The models in equations (1) and (2) represent the empirical specifications to be tested. 
Separate single-equation models are estimated for national effort and budget share. The model 
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in equation (1) interacts categorical variables for five economic groups and two political groups 
(democratic, non-democratic), yielding 10 categories. The model in equation (2) interacts 
categorical variables for two regional groups (richer, poorer) with the two political groups, 




it jm jit mit n nit it
j m n
Y E P X  
  






it rm rit mit n nit it
r m n
Y R P X  
  





Here, Y is either the national effort or budget share measure of total education spending; Ej (j 
= 1, …, 5) constitutes a set of five (1/0) dummy variables, one for each of the five GNI per 
capita country groups; Pm (m = 0, 1) is a set of two (1/0) dummy variables, one for each of the 
political groupings, i.e., democratic, (m = 1) or non-democratic (m = 0); Rr (r = 0, 1) is a set of 
two (1/0) dummy variables, one for each of the two regional country groups (poorer or richer); 
Xn (n = 1, …, N) is a set of continuous control variables comprising a minimum of three or a 
maximum of eight controls; and  is a generic random error term. Subscripts i and t denote 
observations for country i and time t, respectively, and jm, rm and βn are parameters. 
In order to focus on differences in national effort and budget share across groups, we 
reparameterize equations (1) and (2). We include an intercept term and, if there are k distinct 
economic/political categories, k1 dummies are included, to avoid perfect multicollinearity. 
The base category is then represented by the intercept. For equation (1), the base category is 
the group of 21 OECD countries that are democratic. For equation (2), the base category is 
richer countries (or, more accurately, regions comprising the richest countries of the world) 
that are democratic. In the reparameterized model, the coefficients on the interacted dummy 
variables represent mean differences in the education spending measure for the relevant 
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composite economic/political category relative to the base category. So, for example, for 
comparisons of different economic groups with a common political categorization, a series of 
positive (negative) mean differences indicates that poorer countries have higher (lower) levels 
of the associated education spending measure relative to the relevant base category.  
There are three types of robustness check. The least-squares dummy-variable (LSDV) 
estimator with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors is used to obtain the baseline set of 
results. The first set of robustness checks examines a number of different estimators of the 
standard errors.2 These include one-way (country or year) and two-way (country and year) 
clustering, Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard 
errors (Newey and West, 1987, 1994), and Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) standard errors, which 
are robust to heteroskedastic, autocorrelated and cross-sectionally dependent errors. Second, 
quantile (median) regression and robust regression estimates of the parameters are examined 
to check for sensitivity to outlier observations.3 Third, time dummies are included to control 
for year effects.4 
                                                          
2 All estimates are obtained using Stata, version 15. Huber/White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
obtained using ‘vce(robust)’. One-way clustering of standard errors is performed using ‘cluster(country)’ or 
‘cluster(year)’. Two-way clustering is performed with the user-written program ‘vce2way’ (Yoo, 2017). Note that 
‘one-way’ or ‘two-way’ in the tables of results refers to the type of clustering procedure used and not the type of 
fixed effects. Baum, Nichols and Schaffer (2010) and Cameron and Miller (2015) provide a practical discussion 
of cluster-robust inference. The Newey-West procedure (Newey and West, 1987, 1994) is implemented using the 
‘newey’ command. The Driscoll-Kraay procedure (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998) is performed with the user-written 
programme ‘xtscc’ by Hoechle (2007). Hoechle’s code was updated in April 2018 to calculate more ‘conservative’ 
standard errors that take account of a small-sample adjustment. These are reported in our results.  
3 Robust estimation uses the ‘rreg’ routine in Stata, version 15. An initial screening based on Cook’s distance is 
used to remove gross outliers. Starting values are then calculated, and Huber iterations performed, followed by 
biweight iterations, to determine the down-weighting of any outliers; see Hamilton (1991) for further details. 
4 Country dummies (country fixed effects) are not included in any of the specifications. It would not make sense 
to include both components of heterogeneity, such as time-invariant group effects and time-invariant country 
effects, because this would be tantamount to ‘double counting’ fixed effects, with the former being a more 
aggregated version of the latter. In practice, including both types of (fixed) effects on the right-hand side would 
result in near perfect collinearity in the estimation procedure. 
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3. Empirical Results 
Tables 3 and 4 report the empirical estimates for the national effort and budget share, 
respectively, for the model with 10 economic/political categories; the corresponding results for 
the model with four categories are reported in Tables 5 and 6. In the tables of results, the 
coefficient estimates are labelled ‘j#m’ (j = 1, …, 5; m = 0, 1) for equation (1) and ‘r#m’ (r = 
0, 1; m = 0, 1) for equation (2). ‘BASE’ represents the intercept estimate. In each table, eight 
sets of results are reported. Each estimator is applied to a model with no controls (A), and with 
three controls (B). Note that there are no non-democratic OECD or richer countries, so there 
are no results for this combination. 
Robustness checks appear in Appendix Tables A3 and A4 (using LSDV estimation), and 
Tables A5 and A6 (using robust estimation). These tables report results using more than three 
controls and year dummies.  
Estimated coefficients on the control variables have the expected signs. Both the youth 
population and urbanisation variables have positive coefficients. The coefficient on the trade 
variable is positive in most cases, which supports the compensation hypothesis. The largest 
standard errors are those clustered by country (as opposed to by year or by country and year). 
This is not surprising, because there are many countries for which very few observations are 
available for the dependent variable, and this makes it difficult to estimate coefficients 
precisely when clustering by country. Although the explanatory power of each model (as 
measured by R-squared) is not a major focus, accounting for outliers using the two methods of 
weighting observations (quantile and robust estimation) improves the goodness of fit. 
The most important finding from Tables 3 and 4 (Equation (1)), and Tables 5 and 6 
(Equation (2)) is a reversal in the pattern of mean differences for the levels of the national effort 
compared to the budget share. Interacting the economic and political dummies (Tables 3 and 
4) or regional and political dummies (Tables 5 and 6), reveals a pattern of significant negative 
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mean differences (compared to the base category) for the national effort but positive mean 
differences for the budget share. These patterns are similar regardless of whether no controls 
or three controls are used. Controlling for political categorization, richer (poorer) countries 
tend to spend more, on average, in national effort (budget share) terms, although the association 
is not always monotonic.  
Whether a country has a democratic political system is associated with its education 
spending patterns, with significant mean differences within the same economic or regional 
group. For example, regardless of the spending measure (national effort or budget share), 
controlling for economic or regional group, democratic countries tend to spend more on 
average than do their non-democratic counterparts. Table 7 reports a summary of the results 
from a series of pairwise Wald tests, conducted on the robust regression estimates obtained 
from Tables 3 to 6, for the null hypothesis of parameter equality (i.e., no difference in the mean 
levels of education spending for countries with democratic versus non-democratic systems, 
within the same economic or regional group). For example, we can test whether the mean level 
of education spending in low-income democratic countries differs significantly from that of 
low-income countries that are not democratic. Because the intercept term is the common base 
category for all economic/political groups, we can ignore that and focus on the differences in 
the relevant coefficient estimates. We are conducting multiple hypothesis tests, which inflates 
the overall ‘familywise’ Type I error rate, so we apply a Bonferroni correction to the level of 
significance used for each individual test by dividing the familywise error rate (set at 0.05) by  
the number of tests (e.g., 0.05/4 tests = 0.0125). Even with such a correction, most pairwise 






Table 3  
Mean differences in the national effort by income group and regime type.  




LSDV (One-way; Year) LSDV (Two-way) Newey-West Driscoll-Kraay Quantile Robust 
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 
1#0. Low income & not democratic 
-1.551*** -1.635*** -1.551*** -1.635* -1.551*** -1.635*** -1.551*** -1.635* -1.551*** -1.635*** -1.551*** -1.635*** -1.787*** -1.885*** -1.979*** -2.013*** 
(0.254) (0.359) (0.544) (0.911) (0.265) (0.394) (0.549) (0.926) (0.311) (0.486) (0.294) (0.531) (0.133) (0.260) (0.130) (0.207) 
1#1. Low income & democratic 
-1.684*** -1.756*** -1.684*** -1.756** -1.684*** -1.756*** -1.684*** -1.756** -1.684*** -1.756*** -1.684*** -1.756*** -1.757*** -1.877*** -1.724*** -1.759*** 
(0.123) (0.257) (0.330) (0.774) (0.129) (0.255) (0.332) (0.773) (0.178) (0.389) (0.185) (0.371) (0.127) (0.257) (0.153) (0.216) 
2#0. Lower middle income & not 
democratic 
-1.152*** -1.412*** -1.152*** -1.412** -1.152*** -1.412*** -1.152*** -1.412** -1.152*** -1.412*** -1.152*** -1.412*** -1.170*** -1.578*** -1.362*** -1.611*** 
(0.130) (0.220) (0.406) (0.688) (0.108) (0.197) (0.399) (0.681) (0.196) (0.338) (0.152) (0.290) (0.209) (0.259) (0.116) (0.171) 
2#1. Lower middle income & 
democratic 
-0.454*** -0.663*** -0.454 -0.663 -0.454*** -0.663*** -0.454 -0.663 -0.454* -0.663** -0.454*** -0.663*** -0.739** -1.126*** -0.979*** -1.123*** 
(0.158) (0.199) (0.484) (0.627) (0.108) (0.131) (0.470) (0.609) (0.235) (0.305) (0.162) (0.169) (0.318) (0.287) (0.117) (0.159) 
3#0. Upper middle income & not 
democratic 
-1.090*** -1.389*** -1.090** -1.389* -1.090*** -1.389*** -1.090** -1.389* -1.090*** -1.389*** -1.090*** -1.389*** -1.357*** -1.669*** -1.432*** -1.764*** 
(0.155) (0.230) (0.534) (0.801) (0.131) (0.140) (0.527) (0.780) (0.244) (0.369) (0.195) (0.193) (0.166) (0.177) (0.129) (0.146) 
3#1. Upper middle income & 
democratic 
-0.819*** -1.097*** -0.819*** -1.097** -0.819*** -1.097*** -0.819*** -1.097*** -0.819*** -1.097*** -0.819*** -1.097*** -0.797*** -1.131*** -0.935*** -1.133*** 
(0.097) (0.132) (0.295) (0.423) (0.085) (0.119) (0.292) (0.419) (0.141) (0.203) (0.092) (0.159) (0.106) (0.156) (0.106) (0.127) 
4#0. High income (non-OECD) & 
not democratic 
-1.123*** -1.987*** -1.123** -1.987*** -1.123*** -1.987*** -1.123** -1.987*** -1.123*** -1.987*** -1.123*** -1.987*** -1.478*** -1.933*** -1.329*** -2.047*** 
(0.183) (0.217) (0.514) (0.702) (0.197) (0.192) (0.519) (0.695) (0.249) (0.332) (0.273) (0.259) (0.152) (0.195) (0.171) (0.189) 
4#1. High income (non-OECD) & 
democratic 
-0.814*** -0.768*** -0.814** -0.768** -0.814*** -0.768*** -0.814** -0.768** -0.814*** -0.768*** -0.814*** -0.768*** -0.644*** -0.654*** -0.777*** -0.721*** 
(0.091) (0.101) (0.338) (0.357) (0.049) (0.064) (0.329) (0.348) (0.144) (0.156) (0.059) (0.085) (0.123) (0.130) (0.106) (0.111) 
5#0. High income (OECD) & not 
democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
5#1. High income (OECD) & 
democratic BASE 
5.352*** 3.668*** 5.352*** 3.668*** 5.352*** 3.668*** 5.352*** 3.668*** 5.352*** 3.668*** 5.352*** 3.668*** 5.226*** 3.107*** 5.325*** 3.449*** 
(0.055) (0.312) (0.225) (0.945) (0.058) (0.171) (0.226) (0.908) (0.089) (0.467) (0.083) (0.200) (0.056) (0.334) (0.073) (0.260) 
                 
Youth population  0.016***  0.016  0.016***  0.016  0.016*  0.016**  0.022***  0.018*** 
  (0.006)  (0.018)  (0.005)  (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
Urban population  0.009***  0.009  0.009***  0.009  0.009**  0.009***  0.011***  0.011*** 
  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Trade  0.008***  0.008**  0.008***  0.008**  0.008***  0.008***  0.008***  0.007*** 
  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
                 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.060 0.100 0.060 0.100 0.060 0.100 0.060 0.100 n/a n/a 0.060 0.100 0.074 0.107 0.123 0.190 
F-value 35.86*** 34.89*** 3.78*** 3.79*** 78.63*** 120.42*** n/a n/a 15.83*** 15.72*** 60.00*** 387.40*** n/a n/a 43.22*** 48.51*** 
Countries 183 169 183 169 183 169 183 169 183 169 183 169 183 169 183 169 
Years 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 
Observations 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 
Notes: BASE group is high income (OECD) and democratic countries. Three controls are used: youth population (pop024); urban population (urban) and trade (trade). A 
pseudo R-squared is reported for the quantile regression. Not applicable (n/a) means the respective statistic was not available or not reported. The LSDV and quantile estimators 
use Huber/White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The various LSDV estimators use one-way (country or year) and two-way (country and year) cluster-robust standard 
errors. The Newey-West and Driscoll-Kraay estimators use their own covariance matrix corrections to compute heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC), and 
cross-sectional or spatial correlation consistent standard errors under different data-generating assumptions, respectively. The various standard errors are given in parentheses. 










Mean differences in the budget share by income group and regime type.  




LSDV (One-way; Year) LSDV (Two-way) Newey-West Driscoll-Kraay Quantile Robust 
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 
1#0. Low income & not democratic 
3.633*** -0.012 3.633*** -0.012 3.633*** -0.012 3.633*** -0.012 3.633*** -0.012 3.633*** -0.012 3.948*** -0.162 3.387*** -0.210 
(0.436) (0.726) (1.208) (2.003) (0.292) (0.682) (1.163) (1.988) (0.644) (1.069) (0.314) (0.984) (0.608) (0.696) (0.392) (0.614) 
1#1. Low income & democratic 
4.796*** 1.339* 4.796*** 1.339 4.796*** 1.339* 4.796*** 1.339 4.796*** 1.339 4.796*** 1.339 5.135*** 1.290** 4.821*** 1.467** 
(0.381) (0.686) (0.832) (1.748) (0.310) (0.754) (0.802) (1.776) (0.500) (0.966) (0.451) (1.092) (0.366) (0.581) (0.467) (0.643) 
2#0. Lower middle income & not 
democratic 
4.304*** 1.081* 4.304*** 1.081 4.304*** 1.081* 4.304*** 1.081 4.304*** 1.081 4.304*** 1.081 4.231*** 0.614 4.196*** 0.850* 
(0.368) (0.600) (1.148) (1.791) (0.348) (0.563) (1.142) (1.779) (0.555) (0.899) (0.468) (0.803) (0.595) (0.531) (0.353) (0.511) 
2#1. Lower middle income & 
democratic 
4.852*** 2.421*** 4.852*** 2.421* 4.852*** 2.421*** 4.852*** 2.421** 4.852*** 2.421*** 4.852*** 2.421*** 4.137*** 1.661*** 4.224*** 1.830*** 
(0.369) (0.446) (1.009) (1.236) (0.214) (0.390) (0.963) (1.217) (0.548) (0.639) (0.219) (0.440) (0.470) (0.419) (0.348) (0.468) 
3#0. Upper middle income & not 
democratic 
2.520*** -0.022 2.520* -0.022 2.520*** -0.022 2.520* -0.022 2.520*** -0.022 2.520*** -0.022 2.058*** -0.131 2.317*** -0.128 
(0.455) (0.503) (1.380) (1.502) (0.461) (0.378) (1.382) (1.465) (0.663) (0.749) (0.668) (0.547) (0.748) (0.371) (0.405) (0.450) 
3#1. Upper middle income & 
democratic 
3.643*** 1.708*** 3.643*** 1.708 3.643*** 1.708*** 3.643*** 1.708 3.643*** 1.708*** 3.643*** 1.708** 3.556*** 1.205*** 3.411*** 1.347*** 
(0.279) (0.354) (0.862) (1.053) (0.230) (0.415) (0.847) (1.076) (0.409) (0.524) (0.280) (0.617) (0.331) (0.179) (0.318) (0.374) 
4#0. High income (non-OECD) & 
not democratic 
0.987** -2.057*** 0.987 -2.057 0.987** -2.057*** 0.987 -2.057 0.987 -2.057** 0.987* -2.057*** 0.034 -3.107*** 0.683 -2.852*** 
(0.499) (0.566) (1.699) (1.648) (0.378) (0.407) (1.668) (1.600) (0.770) (0.830) (0.516) (0.339) (0.751) (0.356) (0.502) (0.543) 
4#1. High income (non-OECD) & 
democratic 
0.568** -0.038 0.568 -0.038 0.568*** -0.038 0.568 -0.038 0.568 -0.038 0.568** -0.038 0.923*** 0.308 0.471 -0.099 
(0.249) (0.254) (0.834) (0.815) (0.188) (0.211) (0.818) (0.803) (0.372) (0.379) (0.260) (0.284) (0.308) (0.342) (0.333) (0.338) 
5#0. High income (OECD) & not 
democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
5#1. High income (OECD) & 
democratic BASE 
12.245*** 4.332*** 12.245*** 4.332** 12.245*** 4.332*** 12.245*** 4.332** 12.245*** 4.332*** 12.245*** 4.332*** 11.973*** 0.885 12.217*** 2.576*** 
(0.122) (0.831) (0.500) (2.156) (0.088) (0.602) (0.493) (2.079) (0.196) (1.172) (0.128) (0.621) (0.166) (0.643) (0.214) (0.768) 
                 
Youth population  0.146***  0.146***  0.146***  0.146***  0.146***  0.146***  0.191***  0.164*** 
  (0.015)  (0.038)  (0.013)  (0.038)  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
Urban population  0.029***  0.029  0.029***  0.029  0.029***  0.029***  0.046***  0.040*** 
  (0.007)  (0.020)  (0.006)  (0.020)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Trade  0.017***  0.017***  0.017***  0.017***  0.017***  0.017***  0.022***  0.021*** 
  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
                 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.141 0.198 0.141 0.198 0.141 0.198 0.141 0.198 n/a n/a 0.141 0.198 0.092 0.146 0.136 0.226 
F-value 64.55*** 56.40*** 7.16*** 8.08*** 234.33*** 201.25*** n/a n/a 29.30*** 26.94*** 315.69*** 476.80*** n/a n/a 42.96*** 54.58*** 
Countries 175 165 175 165 175 165 175 165 175 165 175 165 175 165 175 165 
Years 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 
Observations 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 
Notes: BASE group is high income (OECD) and democratic countries. The model uses three controls: youth population (pop024); urban population (urban) and trade (trade). 















Table 5  
Mean differences in the national effort by country region and regime type. 




LSDV (One-way; Year) LSDV (Two-way) Newey-West Driscoll-Kraay Quantile Robust 
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 
0#0. Poorer country regions & not 
democratic 
-1.298*** -2.031*** -1.298*** -2.031*** -1.298*** -2.031*** -1.298*** -2.031*** -1.298*** -2.031*** -1.298*** -2.031*** -1.633*** -1.756*** -1.681*** -1.760*** 
(0.147) (0.216) (0.396) (0.582) (0.128) (0.168) (0.389) (0.566) (0.199) (0.315) (0.152) (0.218) (0.117) (0.234) (0.104) (0.199) 
0#1. Poorer country regions & 
democratic 
-0.804*** -1.412*** -0.804** -1.412*** -0.804*** -1.412*** -0.804** -1.412*** -0.804*** -1.412*** -0.804*** -1.412*** -1.163*** -1.235*** -1.110*** -1.178*** 
(0.104) (0.166) (0.343) (0.467) (0.081) (0.135) (0.336) (0.457) (0.158) (0.239) (0.110) (0.162) (0.121) (0.180) (0.098) (0.166) 
1#0. Richer country regions & not 
democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions & 
democratic BASE 
5.169*** 2.095*** 5.169*** 2.095** 5.169*** 2.095*** 5.169*** 2.095** 5.169*** 2.095*** 5.169*** 2.095*** 5.114*** 2.047*** 5.213*** 2.520*** 
(0.069) (0.375) (0.264) (0.989) (0.052) (0.255) (0.260) (0.950) (0.110) (0.534) (0.064) (0.319) (0.062) (0.404) (0.074) (0.348) 
                 
Youth population  0.034***  0.034**  0.034***  0.034**  0.034***  0.034***  0.025***  0.019*** 
  (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Urban population  0.016***  0.016**  0.016***  0.016**  0.016***  0.016***  0.022***  0.020*** 
  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Trade  0.013***  0.013***  0.013***  0.013***  0.013***  0.013***  0.011***  0.011*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
                 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.057 0.167 0.057 0.167 0.057 0.167 0.057 0.167 n/a n/a 0.057 0.167 0.090 0.170 0.154 0.313 
F-value 52.61*** 63.60*** 5.45*** 6.80*** 148.23*** 109.08*** n/a n/a 24.89*** 31.33*** 161.84*** 103.56*** n/a n/a 135.10*** 125.25*** 
Countries 102 97 102 97 102 97 102 97 102 97 102 97 102 97 102 97 
Years 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 
Observations 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are democratic. The model uses three controls: youth population (pop024); urban population (urban) and trade (trade). See 






















Table 6  
Mean differences in the budget share by country region and regime type. 




LSDV (One-way; Year) LSDV (Two-way) Newey-West Driscoll-Kraay Quantile Robust 
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 
0#0. Poorer country regions & not 
democratic 
3.880*** 1.492** 3.880*** 1.492 3.880*** 1.492*** 3.880*** 1.492 3.880*** 1.492* 3.880*** 1.492*** 4.046*** 0.726 3.757*** 1.108* 
(0.305) (0.612) (0.909) (1.609) (0.229) (0.360) (0.887) (1.531) (0.452) (0.892) (0.210) (0.466) (0.499) (0.764) (0.303) (0.597) 
0#1. Poorer country regions & 
democratic 
5.077*** 3.321*** 5.077*** 3.321** 5.077*** 3.321*** 5.077*** 3.321** 5.077*** 3.321*** 5.077*** 3.321*** 4.833*** 2.284*** 4.923*** 2.945*** 
(0.233) (0.458) (0.711) (1.397) (0.141) (0.236) (0.686) (1.341) (0.345) (0.684) (0.157) (0.301) (0.287) (0.496) (0.283) (0.491) 
1#0. Richer country regions & not 
democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions & 
democratic BASE 
11.944*** 5.333*** 11.944*** 5.333 11.944*** 5.333*** 11.944*** 5.333* 11.944*** 5.333*** 11.944*** 5.333*** 11.849*** 2.093** 11.943*** 3.705*** 
(0.127) (1.193) (0.506) (3.265) (0.116) (0.952) (0.504) (3.185) (0.203) (1.719) (0.176) (1.039) (0.160) (0.960) (0.212) (1.036) 
                 
Youth population  0.104***  0.104*  0.104***  0.104*  0.104***  0.104***  0.163***  0.127*** 
  (0.021)  (0.059)  (0.013)  (0.056)  (0.030)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Urban population  0.029***  0.029  0.029***  0.029  0.029**  0.029***  0.044***  0.037*** 
  (0.008)  (0.023)  (0.008)  (0.023)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Trade  0.018***  0.018**  0.018***  0.018**  0.018***  0.018***  0.017***  0.021*** 
  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
                 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.195 0.222 0.195 0.222 0.195 0.222 0.195 0.222 n/a n/a 0.195 0.222 0.140 0.171 0.189 0.247 
F-value 270.00*** 113.21*** 25.86*** 13.06*** 723.40*** 323.35*** n/a n/a 118.36*** 51.83*** 611.34*** 290.39*** n/a n/a 158.19*** 84.82*** 
Countries 99 96 99 96 99 96 99 96 99 96 99 96 99 96 99 96 
Years 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 
Observations 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are democratic. The model uses three controls: youth population (pop024); urban population (urban) and trade (trade). See 
the notes for Table 3. The various standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels are as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7  
Wald tests for parameter equality of the factor-variable interactions. 
         
Wald tests for parameter equality from Tables 3 and 4 
         
 
 Robust Estimator 







(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.0125) 
 Wald Statistic 
Uncorrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.0125) 
Test parameter 1#0 = 1#1 
 F (1, 2459) = 2.19 
No No 
 F (1, 2276) = 2.33 
No No 
 p = 0.1388  p = 0.1273 
Test parameter 2#0 = 2#1 
 F (1, 2459) = 8.90 
Yes Yes 
 F(1, 2276) = 14.79 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0029  p = 0.0001 
Test parameter 3#0 = 3#1 
 F (1, 2459) = 14.38 
Yes Yes 
 F(1, 2276) = 24.17 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0002  p = 0.0000 
Test parameter 4#0 = 4#1 
 F (1, 2459) = 10.20 
Yes Yes 
 F(1, 2276) = 51.44 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0014  p = 0.0000 
 
 Robust Estimator 







(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.0125) 
 Wald Statistic 
Uncorrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.0125) 
Test parameter 1#0 = 1#1 
 F (1, 2185) = 7.33 
Yes Yes 
 F (1, 2057) = 11.37 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0068  p = 0.0008 
Test parameter 2#0 = 2#1 
 F (1, 2185) = 0.00 
No No 
 F (1, 2057) = 6.75 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.9438  p = 0.0094 
Test parameter 3#0 = 3#1 
 F (1, 2185) = 6.88 
Yes Yes 
 F (1, 2057) = 13.88 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0088  p = 0.0002 
Test parameter 4#0 = 4#1 
 F (1, 2185) = 0.16 
No No 
 F (1, 2057) = 25.58 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.6852  p = 0.0000 
         
Wald tests for parameter equality from Tables 5 and 6 
         
 
 Robust Estimator 







(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
 Wald Statistic 
Uncorrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Test parameter 0#0 = 0#1 
 F (1, 1483) = 33.66 
Yes Yes 
 F (1, 1376) = 35.80 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0000  p = 0.0000 
 
 Robust Estimator 







(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
 Wald Statistic 
Uncorrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Test parameter 0#0 = 0#1 
 F (1, 1357) = 16.59 
Yes Yes 
 F (1, 1293) = 37.70 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0000  p = 0.0000 
Notes: The ‘#’ naming convention accords with that in the respective table of results. Using interaction models 
with applicable controls, ‘Yes’ means the relevant interaction parameters are statistically significantly different 
(‘No’ means not significantly different) from one another for the respective pairwise comparison at the 
conventional (uncorrected) 5% level of significance or Bonferroni (corrected) level of significance. (A) refers to 
the model with no controls (unconditional mean differences) and (B) refers to the model with controls (conditional 
mean differences). Because there is only one pairwise test of parameter equality performed on the estimates from 
Tables 5 and 6, α (= 0.05) is the same for both the uncorrected and corrected critical level of significance. 
 
The empirical patterns are robust to using two different estimators (LSDV and robust) and 
differences in model specification (employing more than three controls and including year 
dummies). In the robustness checks, only the more parsimonious regional and political 
specification (in equation (2)) is used, because a richer versus poorer interpretation is the key 
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focus of our study. Appendix Tables A3, A4, A5 and A6 report these results. The estimates for 
the various year fixed effects and controls are excluded from the tables to save space. A detailed 
description of each model specification is given in the notes to Table A3.  
We make three observations about the robustness results. Firstly, including year dummies 
leaves the substantive patterns of mean differences unchanged; signs of the estimated 
coefficients are unaffected in all cases, although there are some changes in marginal levels of 
statistical significance for some of the budget share results. Secondly, if a robust estimator is 
used to deal with outliers, the empirical patterns are exhibited more clearly regardless of the 
specification used. Thirdly, the signs of the coefficients on the various additional controls (hci, 
pop65, military, fiscbal and debt) are as expected in most cases. Introducing an additional 
control each time entails an increasingly more complex specification that either does not 
confound or only partially confounds the empirical patterns.5 The most comprehensive 
specification (using eight controls) provides additional support for the empirical patterns in the 
baseline results. The observed empirical patterns of negative (positive) mean differences for 
the national effort (budget share), compared to the base category, are robust to the use of 




From the perspective of the 2 × 2 categorization in equation (2), richer (developed) 
countries tend to make a greater national effort towards education (they spend more on average 
                                                          
5 Partial confounding refers to the case where only poorer countries that are not democratic are shown to have 
significantly different means from the base group (richer and democratic countries), and with the expected sign. 
No confounding refers to the case where, either, both poorer country groups (irrespective of the state of 
democracy), or, poorer and democratic countries are shown to have significantly different means from the base 
group, and with the expected sign. 
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on education as a share of GDP). In contrast, they tend to have lower budget shares (they spend 
less on average on education as a share of total government spending) relative to poorer (less-
developed) countries. This implies richer countries, on average, have larger public sectors (total 
government spending as a share of GDP) than do poorer countries – consistent with Wagner’s 
law.  
In terms of national effort, richer country governments do not necessarily value education 
more highly than do poorer country governments, but they have greater capacity to leverage 
income from taxes. They can raise more income from taxes because they have larger formal 
private-sector economies. They are therefore less fiscally constrained, and can spend more on 
areas such as education. The inability of poorer-country governments to extract revenue from 
a relatively small tax base constrains not only the growth of these countries’ public sectors – a 
point noted by Holcombe (2005), albeit in more general terms – but also their national effort 
towards education. 
Poorer countries tend to have more informal-sector, cash-based economic activity relative 
to the size of the formal private-sector economy (Schneider and Enste, 2000), which means it 
is more difficult for governments in such countries to extract the tax revenue necessary to 
finance public education. From a budget share perspective, poorer countries tend to spend more 
on education as a share of total government spending because they generally have smaller  
public sectors, which means education tends to comprise a larger share of the total public sector 
budget. However, richer countries are more likely to have large, complex public sectors with a 
greater variety of fiscal components to be financed from tax revenue. For example, the larger 
role of the state in providing various kinds of welfare support in richer countries could lead to 
other forms of public spending, such as education, being assigned a lower priority. An 
implication of this reasoning is that publicly provided education, as a whole, might take on the 
characteristics of a necessity with respect to public sector spending in richer countries. 
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Consequently, from a fiscal varieties perspective, education’s share of the total ‘fiscal pie’ 
tends to be smaller in richer countries with larger public sectors and a greater variety of fiscal 
components to be paid for from the public purse, explaining why the budget share allocation 
to education spending is lower (higher) in richer (poorer) countries. 
There is also a political aspect to this explanation, which reinforces the Wagnerian view, 
because the priorities for education spending differ among poorer countries with contrasting 
levels of democracy. Political pressures compel governments in poorer, democratic countries 
to spend more on areas such as education, but when poorer democratic countries grow, they 
can more easily leverage income from taxes.  
Regardless of the state of economic development, democratic governments tend to be more 
educationally benevolent, and spend more on education. On the other hand, our empirical 
results for the robust estimator with controls (Table 6 and Table A6) show that poorer, non-
democratic countries have low budget shares that are not necessarily different from those of 
richer (democratic) countries. This suggests that the former not only have smaller public 
sectors, but also have lower allocations to education from the public purse. This might partly 
explain why such countries remain poor and less developed. 
Table 8 summarizes the key empirical findings in this study in the form of three inequality 
propositions with respect to richer versus poorer countries. To the best of our knowledge, such 
a characterization of education spending (Propositions 1 and 2) and, by implication, the size of 
the public sector (Proposition 3) has not been presented in this form before. Because the 
inequalities in Propositions 1 and 2 are different for national effort compared to budget share, 
they imply that richer (poorer) countries have larger (smaller) public sectors, consistent with 
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the Wagnerian hypothesis.6 This provides a novel way to characterize and empirically test 
Wagner’s law of public sector expansion. 
 
Table 8 
Three inequality propositions. 
Description Richer Countries  Poorer Countries 

































Notes: E refers to public spending on education, Y to national income 
(GDP) and G to total public spending. Subscripts R and P refer to richer 
and poorer countries, respectively. If Propositions 1 and 2 hold true, then 
they imply Proposition 3. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We examine whether there are mean differences in the levels of public spending on education 
for two widely used national-level measures (national effort and budget share) for different 
economic (or regional) and political groupings of countries. Controlling for the state of 
democracy, we find that richer (poorer) countries tend to spend, on average, a larger (smaller) 
share of GDP on education, but a smaller (larger) share of total government spending on 
education. Richer countries, on average, make a greater national effort towards education, 
whereas poorer countries make a greater budget share allocation to education. By implication, 
                                                          
6 We note two points relating to these inequalities. First, it does not matter whether E, Y and G are measured in 
real or nominal terms, provided both the numerator and denominator of the relevant ratio are measured in the 
same nominal or real terms (using the same deflator). Second, the same estimated size of the public sector in any 
one country, as given by sources such as the IMF, cannot simply be obtained by taking the quotient of the national 
effort and budget share for that country because these education spending measures are estimates. The quotient 
will give only a rough approximation of the size of government, especially for countries that have less accurate 
education spending data. 
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richer countries, on average, have larger public sectors than do poorer countries. In addition, 
for comparable levels of economic development, democratic countries tend to spend more on 
education than is the case for their non-democratic counterparts. 
The findings with respect to levels of development can be summarized in the form of three 
inequality propositions. Examination of education spending patterns reveals a novel way to test 
Wagner’s law empirically. These patterns provide support for the Wagnerian hypothesis, which 
postulates a positive association between the size of government and economic development. 
From a public policy perspective, it would also be informative to test these inequality 
propositions with respect to other components of the government’s budget allocation (e.g., the 
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List of countries and territories by GNI per capita group in 2015 (ypc2015). 
Low income  
(31) 
Lower middle income 
(52) 







































































Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Samoa 
































































































Hong Kong SAR, China 
Hungary 
Iceland 



























St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Martin (French part) 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands 
United Arab Emirates 
Uruguay 






















Source: Adapted from the World Bank’s historical classification. 
Notes: Groups are adapted from the World Bank’s Country and Lending Groups for the 2015 calendar year, based on GNI per 
capita calculated using the World Bank Atlas Method, except for the high-income (OECD) group, which includes the 21 
countries comprising the ‘core’ OECD nations (excluding Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Korea, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey, which are included in the broader 35 OECD 






List of countries by two regional country groups (region). 
Poorer Country Regions 




























































































Richer Country Regions 
































Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses show the total number of countries in each sub-group of the respective country 
regions. For the poorer country regions, Equatorial Guinea, Chile, Uruguay, Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and 
Seychelles (the countries in bold) are excluded because they are classified as high-income (non-OECD) countries 




Table A3  
A summary of changes to the model specification (national effort and LSDV estimator). 
Dependent Variable: 
psegdptot 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
0#0. Poorer country regions  
& not democratic 
-2.031*** -2.183*** -1.764*** -1.866*** -0.991*** -1.072*** -0.568* -0.692* -0.800*** -1.146*** -0.906*** -1.163*** 
(0.216) (0.242) (0.224) (0.258) (0.275) (0.365) (0.296) (0.383) (0.268) (0.293) (0.279) (0.307) 
0#1. Poorer country regions  
& democratic 
-1.412*** -1.543*** -1.379*** -1.448*** -0.578** -0.631** -0.028 -0.102 -0.021 -0.277 -0.042 -0.241 
(0.166) (0.155) (0.176) (0.167) (0.237) (0.288) (0.258) (0.315) (0.257) (0.279) (0.265) (0.288) 
1#0. Richer country regions  
& not democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions  
& democratic BASE 
2.095*** 1.504*** -1.863** -2.243*** -5.403*** -5.626*** -7.503*** -7.711*** -6.685*** -6.649*** -6.539*** -6.743*** 
(0.375) (0.518) (0.760) (0.790) (1.427) (1.549) (1.550) (1.713) (1.241) (1.295) (1.297) (1.370) 
             
R-squared 0.167 0.187 0.201 0.223 0.208 0.229 0.223 0.245 0.353 0.375 0.365 0.384 
F-value 63.60*** 15.33*** 103.09*** 23.20*** 91.08*** 22.81*** 80.33*** 21.89*** 69.88*** 21.30*** 60.49*** 19.72*** 
Countries 97 97 86 86 86 86 85 85 84 84 84 84 
Years 26 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
             
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Covariates (controls) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of control variables 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 
Are the patterns 
confounded? 
No No No No No No Partially Partially Partially Partially Partially Partially 
Observations 1382 1382 1256 1256 1256 1256 1174 1174 1101 1101 1030 1030 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are democratic. All models use a LSDV estimator and robust standard errors. I and II use homogeneous 
slopes and three controls (pop024, urban and trade). III and IV use homogeneous slopes and four controls (pop024, urban, trade and hci). V and VI use 
homogeneous slopes and five controls (pop024, urban, trade, hci and pop65). VII and VIII use homogeneous slopes and six controls (pop024, urban, 
trade, hci, pop65 and military). IX and X use homogeneous slopes and seven controls (pop024, urban, trade, hci, pop65, military and fiscbal). XI and 
XII use homogeneous slopes and eight controls (pop024, urban, trade, hci, pop65, military, fiscbal and debt). See Table 1 for a description of each control 
variable used. Time (year) dummies are used in even-numbered specifications (II, IV, VI, VIII, X and XII). The estimates for the various controls and 
year fixed effects are excluded to save space. Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels are as 






A summary of changes to the model specification (budget share and LSDV estimator). 
Dependent Variable: psegovtot I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
0#0. Poorer country regions  
& not democratic 
1.492** 0.985 1.296** 0.737 1.358** 0.499 2.207*** 1.514** 1.962*** 1.269* 1.803*** 1.668** 
(0.612) (0.664) (0.644) (0.700) (0.637) (0.718) (0.661) (0.755) (0.656) (0.749) (0.667) (0.756) 
0#1. Poorer country regions  
& democratic 
3.321*** 2.799*** 2.970*** 2.451*** 3.035*** 2.204*** 3.784*** 3.186*** 3.717*** 3.162*** 3.561*** 3.391*** 
(0.458) (0.499) (0.481) (0.530) (0.518) (0.596) (0.548) (0.628) (0.539) (0.621) (0.552) (0.630) 
1#0. Richer country regions  
& not democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions  
& democratic BASE 
5.333*** 3.726*** -3.448** -4.803*** -3.737 -3.794 -4.396 -4.194 -1.745 -1.109 -1.285 -1.221 
(1.193) (1.443) (1.686) (1.810) (2.738) (2.805) (2.840) (2.923) (2.867) (2.948) (2.897) (2.955) 
             
R-squared 0.222 0.237 0.296 0.311 0.296 0.311 0.331 0.343 0.347 0.360 0.415 0.423 
F-value 113.21*** 20.02*** 110.62*** 23.58*** 100.86*** 24.23*** 91.63*** 23.86*** 92.91*** 27.10*** 96.81*** 31.64*** 
Countries 96 96 85 85 85 85 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Years 26 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
             
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Covariates (controls) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of control variables 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 
Are the patterns confounded? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 1299 1299 1175 1175 1175 1175 1099 1099 1091 1091 1024 1024 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are democratic. All models use a LSDV estimator and robust standard errors. See the notes for Table 







Table A5  
A summary of changes to the model specification (national effort and robust estimator). 
Dependent Variable: psegdptot I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
0#0. Poorer country regions  
& not democratic 
-1.760*** -2.022*** -1.489*** -1.729*** -1.240*** -1.615*** -0.926*** -1.311*** -0.930*** -1.332*** -1.077*** -1.418*** 
(0.199) (0.206) (0.199) (0.208) (0.260) (0.275) (0.274) (0.291) (0.279) (0.297) (0.274) (0.297) 
0#1. Poorer country regions  
& democratic 
-1.178*** -1.403*** -1.111*** -1.310*** -0.844*** -1.188*** -0.455* -0.785*** -0.424* -0.734*** -0.522** -0.797*** 
(0.166) (0.172) (0.165) (0.172) (0.239) (0.252) (0.253) (0.267) (0.256) (0.271) (0.250) (0.268) 
1#0. Richer country regions  
& not democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions  
& democratic BASE 
2.520*** 1.764*** 0.251 -0.321 -1.013 -0.848 -2.635*** -2.416** -3.139*** -2.862*** -2.688*** -2.624** 
(0.348) (0.425) (0.520) (0.566) (0.924) (0.951) (0.965) (0.998) (1.002) (1.041) (0.988) (1.053) 
             
R-squared 0.313 0.335 0.331 0.351 0.333 0.351 0.338 0.357 0.340 0.363 0.373 0.392 
F-value 125.25*** 22.67*** 103.17*** 22.06*** 88.81*** 21.32*** 74.25*** 19.81*** 62.34*** 18.39*** 60.71*** 18.87*** 
Countries 97 97 86 86 86 86 85 85 84 84 84 84 
Years 26 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
             
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Covariates (controls) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of control variables 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 
Are the patterns confounded? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 1382 1382 1256 1256 1256 1256 1174 1174 1101 1101 1030 1030 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are democratic. All models use a robust estimator. See the notes for Table A3. Significance levels are as 






A summary of changes to the model specification (budget share and robust estimator). 
Dependent Variable: psegovtot I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
0#0. Poorer country regions  
& not democratic 
1.108* 0.522 1.000* 0.310 1.122 0.172 1.972** 1.255 1.798** 1.077 1.614** 1.315* 
(0.597) (0.626) (0.588) (0.617) (0.761) (0.806) (0.771) (0.829) (0.751) (0.804) (0.702) (0.767) 
0#1. Poorer country regions  
& democratic 
2.945*** 2.335*** 2.626*** 1.919*** 2.760*** 1.777** 3.292*** 2.617*** 3.268*** 2.608*** 3.037*** 2.724*** 
(0.491) (0.517) (0.479) (0.503) (0.697) (0.737) (0.709) (0.757) (0.690) (0.734) (0.642) (0.694) 
1#0. Richer country regions  
& not democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions  
& democratic BASE 
3.705*** 1.652 -4.570*** -6.683*** -5.296* -5.963** -5.074* -5.589** -2.121 -2.119 -1.306 -1.495 
(1.036) (1.400) (1.533) (1.748) (2.708) (2.810) (2.701) (2.838) (2.692) (2.821) (2.531) (2.719) 
             
R-squared 0.247 0.264 0.328 0.348 0.328 0.347 0.373 0.386 0.402 0.421 0.483 0.492 
F-value 84.82*** 15.18*** 94.92*** 20.35*** 81.47*** 19.61*** 81.11*** 20.98*** 80.84*** 23.30*** 94.69*** 28.19*** 
Countries 96 96 85 85 85 85 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Years 26 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
             
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Covariates (controls) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of control variables 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 
Are the patterns confounded? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 1299 1299 1175 1175 1175 1175 1099 1099 1091 1091 1024 1024 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are democratic. All models use a robust estimator. See the notes for Table A3. Significance levels are 
as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
